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Note
Two More Problems and Too Little Money: Can Congress
Truly Reform Forensic Science?
Eric Maloney*
Forensic science plays a pivotal role in today’s criminal
justice system.1 While television crime dramas have
popularized images of high-tech modern laboratories and
diligent scientists that always help catch the right bad guy,
there is a lot going on behind the scenes in real-world forensic
labs that may actually be hindering our pursuit of proper
justice for those who commit crimes.2 A stark illustration of
this has emerged in two separate scandals, separated by
several states and thousands of miles, involving misconduct
and poor management procedure in crime labs in Minnesota
and Massachusetts.3 Consequences have been dire; the release
of convicted criminals, possible indefinite delays in the
prosecution of suspects, and increased pressure on already
strained state budgets are just small parts of the fallout.4 These
episodes are just the latest instances of what has become a
recurring issue in forensic science: ensuring that testing results
used to convict criminals are accurate.5
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their hard work and dedication.
1. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE
CMTY. ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD xix–xx (2009) [hereinafter A PATH
FORWARD].
2. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
3. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
4. See infra Part I.B.3.
5. See infra notes 6–8 (identifying a series of proposals to ensure
accuracy and reliability of forensic testing results).
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Federal legislation has been slow to react to this problem.
A 2009 report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward, (the NAS Report) took an in-depth look at the present
state of forensic science,6 and has inspired a raft of commentary
from judges and scholars in its attempt to illustrate the
shortcomings in forensic disciplines.7 The most recent
congressional attempt at improving forensic science standards
comes in the form of a bill proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy
called the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act
(the Act).8 Senator Leahy took the recommendations of the
NAS Report and has attempted to apply them in order to
impose significant reformation of federal regulation in this
area.9
The goal of this Note is to analyze how the Act would have
improved forensic science nationwide, and whether a top-down
approach from Congress can appropriately deal with essentially
localized situations such as those in Minnesota and
Massachusetts. Part I examines the current state of federal
regulation on this issue, the NAS Report, the new legislation,
and the reasons why misconduct has occurred and continues to
occur in forensic laboratories. Part II then takes a critical look
at the Act and examines where it may succeed in leading to
true reform and where it does not, then lays out other
regulatory reforms that may be better suited to ensuring that
we can have confidence in the findings of our forensic
laboratories. In the end, this Note concludes that the Act does
make several important improvements over our current
regulatory system, but there is still a long way to go before our
forensic science system truly meets traditional scientific
standards and ensures confidence in the results obtained by
forensic professionals.

6. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1.
7. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 17 (2012) (“Judicial reaction to the
Report . . . ranges from measured hostility to enthusiastic embrace.”). See
generally id. § 30:10.
8. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. (2011).
9. See infra Part I.A.4.

MALONEY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/12/2013 12:04 PM

FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM

925

I. A HISTORY OF FRAGMENTED REGULATION AND
PROBLEMS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
At the moment, forensic testing facilities and employees
are largely unregulated by the federal government.10 While
Congress set stringent standards over twenty years ago for
clinical laboratory environments running medical tests,11
forensic facilities have only recently been subject to federal
oversight, and such regulation has been largely circumscribed
to their performance of DNA analysis in light of numerous
DNA exonerations.12 However, DNA testing is but a small
fraction of the volume of forensic testing performed in such
laboratories nationwide in processing evidence for use in
criminal proceedings.13 These disciplines include, but are not
limited to, general toxicology, firearm and tool marks,
questioned documents, trace evidence, biological and serological
screening, impression evidence, and controlled substance
analysis.14 In fact, testing of suspected controlled substances
has been a focus of forensic laboratories since the 1970s15 and
remains the most frequent type of testing performed in labs.16
10. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 94–95 (2009) (“[C]rime
laboratories and forensic analysts remain remarkably free from oversight and
still lack basic scientific standards to govern their conclusions.”).
11. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C.
§ 263a (2006); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for
Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 178 (1991) (criticizing lack of regulation
for forensic laboratories and proposing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments of 1988 as a model for reform).
12. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 93–94; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 14131 (2006) (establishing an advisory board on DNA quality assurance
methods under the purview of the FBI); § 14132 (b)(2), (c) (requiring labs to be
externally accredited and undergo bi-annual audits or risk losing access to
national DNA databases); § 14135 (b), (d) (requiring labs to meet § 14132
standards in order to be eligible for grants).
13. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 95.
14. Some types of forensic testing also take place outside of the
laboratory, such as lifting latent fingerprints, digital evidence, and other types
of crime scene investigation. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, STATUS AND NEEDS OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2006),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213420.pdf.
15. Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic
Science: Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 624 (2007).
16. Eighty-two percent of publicly funded forensic labs processed
controlled substance evidence; only fifty-nine percent performed forensic
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The expansive use of forensic testing methods outside of
DNA analysis is especially troubling in light of significant
concerns that have been raised with non-DNA forensic
methodologies.17 The goal of any of forensic analysis is to
“individualize” a sample and match it to a person or a source
for purposes of showing guilt or innocence.18 However, only
DNA has been shown to be able to do this with scientific
certainty based on repeated, consistent research results; other
disciplines have varying levels of available research and set
protocols to ensure the validity of testing results.19 The result is
a patchwork of different disciplines with different levels of
discriminating power, administered by practitioners who may
lack the necessary training to properly interpret results or may
ignore results altogether.20
1. The NAS Report
In order to analyze the current state of these various
forensic disciplines and propose improvements to the forensic
science profession, the National Academy of Sciences conducted
a thorough study of forensic science in Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward, specifically
focusing on the needs and operations of forensic science outside
the realm of DNA analysis.21 The NAS Report called into
question many of the current practices of forensic laboratories,
and suggested avenues to improve the quality of forensic
investigation throughout the country.22 Among its many
recommendations was the implementation of mandatory
accreditation for all forensic facilities and forensic
practitioners.23 The NAS Report stressed that accreditation
cannot prevent mistakes from happening, but would prevent
forensic
practitioners
from
“taking
shortcuts”
and
biology (including DNA) testing. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME
LABORATORIES 2009, at 2 tbl.1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpffcl09.pdf.
17. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 7–8.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 7–8.
20. Simon A. Cole, Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions: From
Exposer to Contributor to Corrector, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711, 735 (2012).
21. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 1.
22. Id. at 3–4.
23. Id. at 215.
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compromising the quality of their work by ensuring that
laboratories are run with set quality standards24 and rely on
acceptable practices.25 In addition to accrediting labs, it also
recommended the certification of individual scientists to ensure
their competency.26 The NAS Report named several such
certification programs that already exist for various forensic
science disciplines,27 including drug analyst certification
through an exam administered by the American Board of
Criminalistics.28
In addition to accreditation and implementing strong
standards, the NAS Report explained the importance of
“proficiency testing” as another safeguard to ensure quality
results.29 Proficiency testing can take several forms, but has
two main variants: a “declared” test in which the examiner is
aware he or she is analyzing a test sample, or a “blind” test in
which he or she is unaware the sample is for testing and not a
real case.30 Commentators have found that forensic
professionals “loathe proficiency testing,”31 but it can be useful
to measure performance of laboratories and identify potential
problems with the performance of individuals or the use of
testing instruments.32 Laboratories accredited by the American
Society of Crime Lab Directors (ASCLD), a body of forensic
professionals that promulgates forensic science standards, are
required to complete at least one proficiency test annually for
each of its provided forensic disciplines.33
In attempting to propose how these new procedures and
standards would be implemented, the NAS Report specifically
24. Id. at 201 (“Adherence to standards reduces bias, improves
consistency, and enhances the validity and reliability of results.”).
25. Id. at 195.
26. Id. at 209.
27. See id. at 209–10, for a complete list.
28. Certification Program Overview, AM. BOARD CRIMINALISTICS,
http://www.criminalistics.com/cert_ovw.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
29. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 206.
30. Id. at 207.
31. Craig M. Cooley, Nurturing Forensic Science, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 441, 478 (2011).
32. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 215 (recommending that forensic
labs establish quality control procedures to ensure work accuracy and identify
fraud and mistakes).
33. AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. LAB. ACCREDITATION BD.,
PROFICIENCY TESTING AND REVIEW PROGRAM 4 (2011) [hereinafter
PROFICIENCY TESTING AND REVIEW PROGRAM], available at http://www.ascldlab.org/documents/AL-PD-1020.pdf.
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called for a “strong, independent, strategic, coherent, and wellfunded federal program to support and oversee the forensic
science disciplines in this country.”34 The agency, named in the
NAS Report as the National Institute of Forensic Science,35
would then mandate accreditation of laboratories and
individual professionals36 and provide funding for research to
validate and measure scientific accuracy in forensic practices.37
Such a body would need to be independent from existing
criminal justice regulators, such as the Department of Justice
(DOJ), in order for it to be as objective and free from history
and biases as possible.38 Additionally, the NAS Report
recommended improving the education of forensic scientists
through development of improved graduate programs and use
of scholarships to attract ideal candidates.39
2. Current Federal Regulation
Federal regulation of general forensic disciplines beyond
DNA-specific legislation currently consists of requirements
attached to grant provisions, such as those contained in the
Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act in
2000.40 The aim of this bill was to reduce significant backlogs in
processing forensic evidence through block grants to states to
fund new equipment, training, and personnel for laboratories.41
These grants were to be given only if labs were accredited by
the ASCLD or would use the funds to seek this certification.42
In 2004, the Justice for All Act further required that labs
receiving funding also be governed by an entity capable of
34. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 20.
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 25–26. See also Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and
Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 227–
34 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of a forensics commission in setting
standards and funding laboratories).
37. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 24–25.
38. Id. at 80.
39. Id. at 27–28.
40. Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
41. DNA Crime Labs: The Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences
Improvement Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
3 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
42. Id.
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investigating allegations of misconduct or serious negligence in
order to be eligible for grants.43
These attempts at regulating state and local forensic
laboratories are essential because the “lion’s share” of criminal
prosecutions44 and evidence processing45 occurs in state
criminal justice systems. However, the efficacy of this federal
scheme to affect change for this fragmented variety of forensic
science providers has been questioned.46 As a general matter,
predicating the operations of state and local entities on federal
funding, while upheld in South Dakota v. Dole,47 raises
significant issues of federalism and calls into question whether
Congress’s spending power is a constitutionally proper
mechanism to influence state behavior.48 Ryan Goldstein, in a
student note written for the University of Texas Law Review,
found that the Coverdell Program federal grants constituted a
very small percentage of state and local laboratory operating
budgets based on 2005 figures;49 this disparity between federal
funding and local spending has since increased, according to
more recent reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.50
43. Justice for All Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. § 3797k(4) (2006).
44. Ryan M. Goldstein, Note, Improving Forensic Science Through State
Oversight, 90 TEX. L. REV. 225, 233 (2011); see also A PATH FORWARD, supra
note 1, at 5–6 (emphasizing the workload of state and local law enforcement
and the disparity in resources available in state and federal systems); STEVEN
W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN
STATE COURTS 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 2–3 (2007), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf
(providing
that
state
prosecutors’ offices closed 2.9 million felony cases in 2007).
45. State and local labs received ninety-three percent of total requests for
forensic services in 2009. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 5 tbl.7.
46. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233 (focusing on state oversight of
forensic facilities and claiming that other commentators have failed to do so).
47. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
48. There has been significant scholarly debate about Congress’s spending
power and the wisdom of the Dole decision. Compare Lynn A. Baker &
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its
Spending Doctrine and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So,
78 IND. L.J. 459, 470 (2003) (arguing that Dole is “intellectually suspect” and
will “continue to yield . . . troublesome results”), with Erwin Chemerinsky,
Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 92 (2000) (“[A] broad
definition of the spending power is desirable.”).
49. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233 n.71.
50. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates the 2009 operating budget
of state and local labs at $1.213 billion. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 10
tbl.14. Only $10.8 million has been awarded to state and local labs in 2012
under the Coverdell program. Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants
Program: Applications and Awards, 2002–2011, NAT’L INST. JUST.,
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Furthermore, the requirement that labs be subject to external
auditing has reportedly not been enforced by the DOJ.51
3. State Standards
Regulation and funding of forensic laboratories largely
remains the prerogative of local legislators and executives.52
Publicly funded labs are run by states, counties, and
municipalities,53 and their regulation is dependent on the
government body responsible.54 As a consequence, standards
for lab operation vary from state to state. A few states have
voluntarily chosen to pursue accreditation for all of their
forensic facilities, using state-created standards.55 Other
jurisdictions requiring accreditation have mandated use of an
outside professional forensic science agency like the American
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors.56 For the most part,
state legislation either fails to address accreditation at all or, as
is the case in Minnesota and Massachusetts, “encourage[s]”

http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/lab-operations/capacity/nfsia/nfsiaapplications-funding.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012).
51. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 94. See also OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS’ PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT GRANTS
PROGRAM 8 (2008) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF GRANTS
PROGRAM].
52. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233 (“The decisions of state
legislatures and state executives—and not those of the United States
Congress—determine a state’s forensic science policies, the structure of its
laboratories, and changes to its regulatory scheme.”).
53. The 2009 DOJ census of publicly funded labs analyzed laboratories
based on their designation as state, county, or municipal entities. See DUROSE
ET AL., supra note 16.
54. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233.
55. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 17-2A-02 (LexisNexis 2012)
(Secretary of Health sets standards and requirements for forensic
laboratories); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 2012) (Commission on
Forensic Science sets standards); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35
(West 2012) (Department of Public Safety sets standards).
56. The ASCLD has certified 326 state and local crime laboratories,
including at least one in every state. ASCLD/LAB Accredited Laboratories,
SOC’Y
CRIME
LABORATORY
DIRECTORS,
http://ascldAM.
lab.org/labstatus/accreditedlabs.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012); see also D.C.
CODE § 5-1501.06 (2012) (requiring all public crime laboratories to be
accredited by a nationally recognized organization); Forensic Laboratory
Accreditation Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §§ 150.36–37 (2012) (requiring all
public crime laboratories to be accredited by a nationally recognized
organization).

MALONEY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM

7/12/2013 12:04 PM

931

facilities to pursue it.57 Many labs do choose to seek
accreditation on their own; ninety-two percent of state forensic
crime labs had attained accreditation from an organization like
the Laboratory Assessment Board division of the ASCLD
(ASCLD/LAB) as of 2009.58 However, the same was true of only
sixty-two percent of municipal and seventy-five percent of
county laboratories.59
Several states, including Massachusetts and Minnesota,
have also created forensic advisory boards to handle complaints
of misconduct and oversee operation of laboratories60 which are
likely to meet the requirements of the Justice for All Act.
However, these boards have been criticized as ineffective and
underfunded,61 and Minnesota’s board has specifically reported
that it “lacks the financial resources necessary to carry out its
principal missions” of investigating allegations of misconduct
and fraud.62 The Minnesota Forensic Laboratory Advisory
Board’s procedure for obtaining allegations of misconduct
simply consists of a web page providing an address to which a
complaint may be written.63 The Board then screens complaints
based on a set of criteria and may appoint an investigative
team if a complaint warrants such action.64 The Massachusetts
Forensic Sciences Advisory Board, in contrast, has no
investigative powers bestowed on it by statute, with its duties

57. See MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 184A
(2012) (delegating to the state forensic advisory board responsibility to study
accreditation status of crime labs in the state); see also A PATH FORWARD,
supra note 1, at 194 (“[W]ith the exception of [a few states], the accreditation
of laboratories . . . remains voluntary.”).
58. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 1 fig.1.
59. Id.
60. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 184A
(2012); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 2012).
61. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF GRANTS PROGRAM, supra note 51,
at 8; see also States’ Efforts to Probe Crime Labs Stall at Start, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Mar. 24, 2007, at A13.
62. STATE OF MINN. FORENSIC LAB. ADVISORY BD., LEGISTLATIVE REPORT
1 (2012), available at https://dps.mn.gov/entity/flab/Documents/Legislative%
20Report%201-15-12.pdf.
63. Reporting Professional Negligence or Misconduct, MINN. FORENSIC
LABORATORY ADVISORY BOARD, https://dps.mn.gov/entity/flab/Pages/reportingprofessional-negligence-or-misconduct.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
64. MINN. FORENSIC LAB. ADVISORY BD., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, at
§§ 3.0–4.0 (2012), available at https://dps.mn.gov/entity/flab/Documents/
FLAB%20Policies%20and%20Procedures%202012.pdf.
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being primarily oversight of operations, funding,
accreditation of the state’s forensic laboratories.65

and

4. The Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act
One attempt to implement the NAS Report through federal
legislation came from Senator Patrick Leahy, who introduced a
Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act in 2011
aimed at implementing widespread reform in the forensic
sciences.66 Based in part on the findings of the NAS Report,67
the Act would have established an independent federal
Forensic Science Board to create standards and promote good
practices, as well as an Office of Forensic Science within the
DOJ to administer the Board’s recommendations.68 The Board
would then have acted to create procedures for accreditation of
forensic science laboratories, as well as certification for each
individual working in those laboratories.69 Any lab lacking
certification under these standards, for either the facility or
any of its personnel, would be barred from receiving any direct
or indirect federal funding.70
The Act also would have required the Board to develop a
“comprehensive strategy for fostering and improving peerreviewed scientific research relating to the forensic science
disciplines,” to both validate and improve the reliability of
existing forensic techniques and develop new methods of
forensic investigation.71 There were also provisions related to
improving the education of current criminal justice
practitioners72 and of undergraduate and graduate students

65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 184A (2012) (“[T]he undersecretary for
forensic sciences shall advise the board on the administration and delivery of
forensic services in the commonwealth.”).
66. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong.
67. Improving Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing
on S. 132 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)
(describing the NAS Report as a “starting point for a searching review of the
state of forensic science in the country”).
68. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 101–02.
69. Id. §§ 202, 303.
70. Id. §§ 201, 302.
71. Id. §§ 401–02.
72. Id. § 601.
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wishing to enter the forensic science disciplines.73 The Act
would have appropriated funding for various grants to
laboratories and research entities, as well as for operations of
the two agencies created and their sub-committees.74 The bill
did not pass in the 112th Congress75 and has yet to be reintroduced by Senator Leahy in the 113th Congress.76
B. WHEN FORENSIC SCIENCE FAILS THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
The effectiveness of current regulation of forensic
laboratories has been called into question by a number of
academics and criminal law practitioners.77 Recent scandals
involving forensic laboratories highlight this concern. This Note
will focus on two specific examples: the operation of a crime
laboratory in St. Paul, Minnesota, and the conduct of a drug
analyst in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts.
1. The St. Paul Problem
Problems with forensic science results commonly stem
from improper laboratory policies and procedures78 and are
exemplified by the procedures now being exposed at the St.
Paul, Minnesota, crime laboratory regarding evidence handling

73. Id. § 602.
74. See, e.g., id. § 402(c) (appropriating $90,000,000 per year for research
grants); § 104 (appropriating $40,000,000 per year for operation of the Board
and the Office).
75. The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and
was never considered by the full Congress. Bill Summary & Status, S.132,
112th Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:
SN00132:@@@X (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
76. A check of bills introduced in the 113th Congress by Senator Leahy
provide that he has not re-introduced a bill addressing forensic science reform.
Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011–2012) S.132 All Congressional
Actions, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN00132:
@@@X (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
77. See, e.g., A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 6; Cooley, supra note 33,
at 441 (“Tremendous scrutiny has been directed at the forensic science
community recently. . . . [T]he majority of the blame can be placed on two
situations: (1) the numerous crime laboratory problems and scandals, and (2)
the DNA exonerations involving unvalidated forensic technology, forensic
evidence improperly used beyond its scientific parameters, or exaggerated
testimony from a forensic analyst.”); Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 93–
95.
78. Cf. Cooley, supra note 31, at 442 (“[S]ignificant evidence has surfaced
over the last decade indicating that public crime laboratories . . . are
inadequately funded, staffed, and regulated.”).
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and testing protocol.79 Employees at the lab have testified that
they did not follow any written procedures in conducting
testing of possible illegal substances.80 Employees claimed that
some of the lab equipment was poorly ventilated, causing it to
possibly spew illegal substances into the air and contaminate
subsequent tests.81 Tests may also have been unreliable due to
the failure of technicians to properly change their gloves in
between tests, as well as multiple uses of the same tool when
interacting with different samples.82 Evidence from criminal
cases was improperly stored in a hallway, and guests to the
laboratory may have had access to unattended evidence
samples left on work stations.83 All of these issues came to light
during testimony in connection with four drug cases in Dakota
County, Minnesota.84 This evidence has all emerged in a
hearing under a Dakota County judge, who has already had
multiple hearings on the admissibility of drug evidence
produced by the laboratory and will not issue a ruling until
sometime after May 3, 2013.85 Two outside consultants hired to
evaluate the lab have confirmed these issues, citing poor
procedures, faulty scientific procedure, and dirty equipment as
some of the main culprits.86
Deficiencies in the laboratory’s procedures were known to
St. Paul police and the city government; a 2006 report by a
police official recommended ASCLD accreditation87 and over $1
79. See Chao Xiong, Case Tied to Faulty Lab Dropped, STAR TRIB., Oct. 9,
2012, at B1.
80. Madeleine Baran, Hearing on St. Paul Police Crime Lab Problems
Wraps Up, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012), http://minnesota.
publicradio.org/display/web/2012/10/23/law/st-paul-crime-lab/.
81. Chao Xiong, Crime Lab Reviews Cost $140K, STAR TRIB., Sept. 7,
2012, at B1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Chao Xiong, Defense Attorneys Decry Retested Evidence, STAR TRIB.,
Dec. 6, 2012, at B3.
85. Madeleine Baran, Judge Postpones Crucial Decision in St. Paul Crime
PUB.
RADIO
NEWS
(Feb.
22,
2013),
Lab
Case,
MINN.
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2013/02/22/news/judgepostpones-crucial-decision-in-st-paul-crime-lab-case.
86. Apparently one of the employees even attempted to cite Wikipedia as
a “technical reference.” Madeline Baran, Troubled St. Paul Crime Lab
Problems Even Worse than First Thought, Probe Reveals, MINN. PUB. RADIO
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2013/02/14/
news/saint-paul-crime-lab-major-errors-found.
87. David Hanners, St. Paul Crime Lab Woes First Recognized in 2006,
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million for new equipment and employee costs.88 St. Paul failed
to follow through on either accreditation or the bulk of the
funding recommendations of the report.89 The report further
provided that the paucity of monies available to the lab has
overburdened the staff and limited the laboratory’s ability to
“sustain [its] current rates of evidence examination and
testing.”90
2. The Jamaica Plain Problem
Another type of recurring problem is with so-called “bad
apple” forensic professionals, who provide false or inaccurate
test results and subsequent trial testimony.91 This problem has
arisen recently with a Boston-area forensic analyst named
Annie Dookhan who is alleged to have falsified testing results
on numerous occasions.92 Dookhan has been accused of
sprinkling known drugs onto unrelated samples in order to
obtain positive results.93 Dookhan has also admitted to “drylabbing” or the identifying a sample without actually
performing any tests on that substance.94 She is alleged to have
failed to properly handle evidence and run control samples
before testing evidence.95 The Jamaica Plain laboratory has
been shut down since the summer of 2012, and Dookhan has
resigned as a result of her admissions to police and subsequent
inquiry into the lab’s operations.96 She currently faces twenty
PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 1, 2012, at 1A (quoting from the report which said that
ASCLD accreditation would take the lab to “the highest standards . . . as well
as gaining added credibility for the lab”).
88. Id. (“Lynch identified $606,750 worth of ‘critical’ equipment, staffing
and training needs. He listed another $579,850 in tools, positions and
education costs . . . .”).
89. Id.
90. Staff were apparently so burdened with testing responsibilities that
they were unable to attend training sessions offered at no cost from the
government and private vendors. Id.
91. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 36, at 172–208 (detailing numerous
examples).
92. John R. Ellement et al., State Chemist Accused of Mixing Drug
Samples, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 13, 2012, at B1.
93. Id.
94. Brian Ballou & Andrea Estes, ‘I Messed Up Bad. It’s My Fault,’
Chemist Says, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2012, at A1.
95. See Report from Detective Lieutenant Robert M. Irwin to Lieutenant
Colonel Francis J. Matthews, Mass. State Police (Sept. 12, 2012) (Interview of
Annie
Dookhan),
available
at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/
breaking_news/Dookhan.Discovery%209.26.12.pdf.
96. Denise Lavoie, Ex-State Chemist Pleads Not Guilty, BOS. GLOBE, Jan.
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charges in various Massachusetts district courts stemming
from her misconduct and has so far pled not guilty to the
assorted offenses, which mainly consist of obstruction of
justice.97 While Dookhan’s exact reasons for the misconduct are
unknown, at least one author has posited that a backlog at the
Jamaica Plain lab may have caused her to cut corners in an
attempt to deal with her workload.98
3. Consequences
All of these problems have had very real results on the
administration of justice in our criminal courts. There have
been more than 300 exonerations of convicted felons since the
advent of DNA testing,99 with a large percentage of those initial
convictions based on faulty forensic science.100 In the Dookhan
case, almost 34,000 criminal cases could be affected, including
1,100 people currently in jail or prison.101 At least one
prosecution has been dropped as a result of the St. Paul
scandal, with more than one hundred other testing results
being re-examined by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension’s laboratory.102 The fiscal fallout of these cases is
yet to be determined, and has been estimated to be more than
$30 million in Massachusetts103 and has already cost the City
of St. Paul more than $140,000 in Minnesota.104 St. Paul has
also been forced to set aside nearly $1 million in a contingency
fund to take care of resulting future costs in the form of

31, 2013, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/31/ chemistannie-dookhan-pleads-not-guilty-obstruction/8LSlUcGVCpXkSHYred9omI/
story.html.
97. Id.
98. The laboratory had already applied for federal funding to deal with a
backlog of 8,000 cases. Eugenie Samuel Reich, Boston Scandal Exposes
Backlog, 490 NATURE 153, 153 (2012).
99. According to The Innocence Project, there have been 303 postconviction exonerations due to DNA analysis. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
100. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 1–2 (explaining that their
study concluded that sixty percent of cases they examined contained forensic
analyst testimony with misstated or wholly missing empirical data).
101. See Reich, supra note 98, at 153.
102. Xiong, supra note 79, at B1.
103. John R. Ellement, Prosecutors Say $30m Not Enough for Drug Lab
Scandal Fallout, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2012, at B2.
104. Xiong, supra note 84, at B3.
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consultant fees and re-testing in other labs.105 In light of the
widespread effect of these forensic mishaps, it is important to
examine what impact, if any, the Criminal Justice and Forensic
Science Reform Act could have on the operation of forensic labs.
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION: A BAND-AID OR A CURE?
A. THE DEVIL’S IN THE DETAILS: CRITIQUING THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND SCIENCE REFORM ACT
Hanging over federal legislative efforts to reform forensic
science, like the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform
Act, is a question: can these measures live up to their billing
and truly reform forensic science? In the case of the Act, the
answer is a qualified no. For every step the bill took toward
improving the operations of forensic disciplines and better
regulating the profession, the language of the bill was either
too vague or wholly failed to address significant issues which
are essential to promoting these goals. In order to ensure that
forensic science continues its progress toward becoming socalled “real” science and can prevent future mishaps from
occurring, legislators will need to build upon the ideas in the
Act, work to ensure greater funding for those in the forensic
field, and perhaps put greater emphasis on affecting change at
the state and local government levels.
1. Accreditation and Certification
The Act is most significant in the steps it takes toward
implementing some of the reforms mentioned in the NAS
Report. The creation of a Forensic Science Board (the Board) to
determine best standards and practices for laboratories106 is a
cornerstone of the NAS Report and essential to federal
administration of forensic standards. Previous federal
regulation merely required labs to obtain some sort of outside
accreditation;107 this provision takes the responsibility for lab
105. The police have already budgeted one-third of this money to be spent
on consultants and a contract with the state crime lab, as the St. Paul lab is
currently performing only fingerprint analysis. Mara H. Gottfried, St. Paul
Crime Lab: Police Detail Plans for $1M More from City, PIONEER PRESS (Jan.
31, 2013), http://www.twincities.com/crime/ci_22492197/st-paul-crime-labpolice-detail-plans-1m?.
106. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 102(d)(1) (“The Board shall . . . make recommendations to the
Director relating to . . . accreditation and certification standards . . . .”).
107. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
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standards out of the hands of third parties and puts it into
more direct control by the government. This is not to say that
those outside standards are meritless. In fact, the Act proposes
that a newly created Board use standards like the ASCLD/LAB
in promulgating their laboratory regulations108 and would
allow accreditation through third parties.109
Specifically, the ASCLD/LAB’s accreditation program
requires that laboratories have in place:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

[P]rocedures to protect evidence loss, cross-transfer,
contamination, and/or deleterious change;
validated and documented technical procedures;
the use of appropriate controls and standards;
calibration procedures;
complete documentation of all evidence examination;
a documented training program that includes competency
testing;
technical review of a portion of each examiner’s work
product;
testimony monitoring of all who testify; and
a comprehensive proficiency testing program.110

The Board could choose to implement these requirements
wholesale or modify them as they see fit, so long as these
standards include education, proficiency testing, and auditing
requirements for laboratories.111 The Act would then allow the
Board to enforce them through the machinery of government—
in this case, the also newly created Office of Forensic Science
within the DOJ.112
The provision of the Act requiring certification of
individual forensic scientists113 is something lacking in current
federal regulation114 and is another significant step toward
108. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 202(a)(3)(A)(i) (the Board must consider “relevant national
accreditation standards” in setting its recommendations).
109. Id. § 203 (a)(2)(A).
110. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 198 (citing R. Stacey, President,
ASCLD/LAB, Presentation to the Committee (Jan. 25, 2007)).
111. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 202(a)(3)(B).
112. Id. § 101(e)(2)(A).
113. Id. § 302 (“[A] forensic science laboratory or covered entity may not
receive, directly or indirectly, any Federal funds, unless all relevant personnel
of the forensic science laboratory or covered entity are certified under this
title.”).
114. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 252 n.217 (“The forensic science
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ensuring competency of forensic practitioners. These
certifications can be obtained through outside organizations,115
which typically require applicants to undergo training and pass
an examination on the discipline in which they wish to be
certified.116 Specifically, for drug analysts, the American Board
of Criminalistics requires successful completion of an exam and
a proficiency test, as well as two years of experience.117 A fouryear degree in a natural science is optional and allows the
applicant to apply for a higher level of certification.118 There is
also a lower “affiliate” level of certification for those who do not
yet have two years of specialized experience.119 While some of
the certification programs have been critiqued as lacking
stringent requirements,120 certification of individuals is an
important addition to the overall regulatory scheme to ensure
that lab employees are trained and able to follow scientific
procedures. Accreditation of labs only covers the operating
procedures and facilities of laboratories; it does not address the
education and skill of those working within them.
A preliminary issue with the system the Act puts in place
is the two-tiered nature of this accrediting scheme: the Board
recommends standards, and the Office of Forensic Science (the
Office) within the DOJ enforces them.121 For an Act that is
purportedly based on the NAS Report, this provision goes
directly against one of its recommendations—independence of
regulatory bodies from traditional law enforcement.122 The
Board is nominally autonomous through the mandated
scientific make-up of its board members123 and has relative

community generally supports certification but does not require it.”).
115. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 304(b)(1) (providing that the Director may choose one or more
outside organizations through which to certify individuals in particular
forensic disciplines).
116. See, e.g., Certification Program Overview, supra note 28.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 209 (citing numerous
news articles on the potential ease of obtaining some types of scientific expert
credentials).
121. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
122. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 183–84 (detailing the
“significant concerns related to the independence of the laboratory and its
budget”).
123. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 102(b)(3) (“The Board shall include . . . not fewer than 10
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freedom to recommend regulations as it sees fit.124 However,
the Board’s counterpart, the Office, is placed directly within the
main law-enforcement arm of the U.S. government. The Office
has ultimate responsibility for establishing, implementing, and
enforcing the accreditation and certification standards under
the Act; the Board acts merely to make recommendations to
them.125 With this responsibility comes the worry that the
Office will be less than diligent in its enforcement to prevent
hampering law enforcement at the lower levels.126 This risk of
biased enforcement is a significant one, and is in direct
contravention of one of the recommendations of the NAS
Report.127 Similarly, the Act also fails to follow the NAS Report
by omitting a requirement that forensic laboratories
themselves be independent from law enforcement entities.128
Another concern with the Act’s accrediting scheme is that
it uses the same enforcement mechanism as the Coverdell
Grants program––namely, the funding or withholding of
funds129––which raises significant doubts that these new
accreditation standards will be as “mandatory” as the Act
claims they will be and as envisioned by the NAS Report.130
Under the Act, the Director of the Office of Forensic Science is
charged with verifying that laboratories and forensic
professionals employed therein meet the standards the Board
promulgates before providing federal funds to these labs.131
This use of “spending power” regulation is nearly identical to
the Coverdell program, which similarly premises funding on
conformity with the program’s accreditation and oversight
requirements.132 Congress has frequently used its control of the
members who have comprehensive scientific backgrounds . . . .”).
124. Id. § 202(a)(3)(B) (detailing what accreditation standards must
include); § 303(a)(2) (same for certification standards).
125. Id. § 201(b).
126. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 80–81 (arguing that a national
body tasked with implementing the recommendations of the report must not
be part of a law enforcement agency).
127. Id.
128. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 250 (claiming that the NAS Report’s
recommendation of independent forensic facilities is “infeasible and unlikely to
receive political support”).
129. See supra Part I.A.2.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 106–12; supra text accompanying
notes 23–25.
131. See supra Part I.A.4.
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3797k (West 2012).
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fiscal purse to direct activity of states and local bodies after the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such conduct in
South Dakota v. Dole.133 The Court in Dole held that the
congressional use of the spending power in this manner is
permissible so long as it meets a five-part test determining
whether Congress is intending to coerce states with federal
funds.134 This holding has been broadly interpreted,135 and it is
unlikely the courts would find issue with the funding scheme in
the Act.
Assuming the Act’s constitutionality, the more important
question is whether this use of funding as an enforcement
mechanism will be effective in achieving the Act’s stated goal of
“strengthen[ing] and promot[ing] confidence in the criminal
justice system.”136 Kyle Goldstein examined the similar funding
provisions in the Coverdell grant program, and postulated that
they failed to lead to meaningful reform at the state and local
level, largely because Coverdell funding constituted too small a
percentage of forensic laboratory operating budgets.137
Goldstein’s concerns can be applied wholesale to the Act.
This bill only authorizes $10 million in new grant money to
assist laboratories in attaining accreditation.138 Even when
added to the grants already available under the Coverdell
program, federal funding constitutes an ever-shrinking piece of

133. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See, e.g., David E.
Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. Rev.
496, 535 (2007) (“Congress today probably directs more human behavior by
conditions accompanying federal funding than by any exercise of its legislative
powers.”).
134. The five prongs are: (1) exercise of the spending power must be for the
“general welfare” and courts defer substantially to Congressional judgment in
this regard; (2) Congress must make the condition required to receive funding
unambiguous; (3) conditions on funding must be related to the federal interest
in national projects or programs; (4) conditions must also be in accordance
with other constitutional provisions; and (5) the conditions specified must not
be so coercive as to turn pressure into compulsion. See Baker & Berman, supra
note 48, at 463–69 (detailing the Dole test and its subsequent application by
various courts).
135. See, e.g., id. at 468 (“[L]ower courts have consistently failed to find
impermissible coercion.”).
136. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 3.
137. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 256–57 (claiming that “states spend
significantly more on forensic science operations than the federal government
offers”).
138. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 305(b)(1).
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the funding pie for forensic facilities as their operating budgets
continue to increase.139 According to a report issued by the
DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, Coverdell grants constituted
less than two percent of total laboratory operating budgets in
2009.140 Criminal justice regulation has long been the purview
of the states,141 and it is doubtful that states will have incentive
to implement real change if the only sanction they face for noncompliance is the loss of a sliver of their overall lab funding.
2. What This Means for Reform and Preventing Future
Scandals
The Act’s failure to effectively mandate accreditation and
certification is disheartening because both are crucial to
preventing the recurrence of forensic misconduct. Neither the
St. Paul nor the Jamaica Plain drug analysis laboratories were
accredited by their respective state governments or an outside
body like the ASCLD/LAB.142 In fact, the city of St. Paul
expressly decided not to seek accreditation or provide
additional funding to the laboratory when a report
recommended such measures.143 The consequent lack of
standard operating procedures at the St. Paul crime lab was
cited as contributing to the problems with the drug analysis.144
This is something that could have been corrected with the
oversight of a regulatory body. If this laboratory had been
mandated to seek accreditation, it would also mean that
proficiency testing would have been required.145 These tests

139. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 10 tbl.14 (displaying annual
operating budgets for publicly funded state and local forensic crime
laboratories as $738 million in 2002 and $1.213 billion in 2009).
140. Compare id. (citing the total annual operating budget of publicly
funded state and local forensic laboratories as $1.213 billion in 2009), with
Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program: Applications and
Awards, 2002–2011, supra note 50 (less than $23.4 million awarded to labs in
2009).
141. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 637–43 (1995) (holding that
criminal statutes which fail to substantially affect interstate commerce do not
fall within Congress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause).
142. These laboratories do not appear on the ASCLD website as accredited
labs. See ASCLD/LAB Accredited Laboratories, supra note 56.
143. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Baran, supra note 80.
145. PROFICIENCY TESTING AND REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 33, at 4–6
(establishing a review program that requires accredited laboratories to
participate in proficiency testing).
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could have validated the accuracy of the testing machinery and
caught issues with contamination before they had a widespread
effect on the quality of drug analysis, costing the state millions
of dollars, and affecting many convicted and charged criminal
defendants.
The role of accreditation and certification in preventing
situations of “bad apple” forensic scientists is more tenuous. A
requirement that a scientist like Dookhan seek certification of
her drug analysis skills through a body like the American
Board of Criminalistics would have ensured that she was, at
the least, subject to some education and an examination testing
her knowledge of proper procedures.146 The problem is that
scientists, like Dookhan, who skip proficiency testing,
purposely contaminate samples, and produce test results
without actually running analysis may do so even if
competently trained and subject to lab regulations; a “bad
apple” can just choose to ignore these rules and conduct testing
as he or she sees fit. At the very least, though, having
procedures and competency requirements makes it less likely
that this blatant misconduct will occur due to greater oversight
and education of scientists.
The funding mechanisms of the Act would not only be
ineffective in prompting state regulatory changes, but would
fail to address how a general lack of funding for forensic
laboratories has a negative impact on the work product and
employee conduct at these facilities.147 As exemplified in St.
Paul and Jamaica Plain, budgetary concerns may lead crime
laboratories to forego accreditation and forensic scientists to
cheat on their testing to deal with a backlog of cases and lack of
other qualified personnel to adequately handle the work load.
The Act’s appropriation of $10 million to aid facilities in
seeking accreditation is helpful, but it, as noted above, is a drop
in the bucket compared to total operating budgets of forensic
laboratories.148 Furthermore, it is only a quarter of the $40
million the Act appropriates for staff and operations of the
various government agencies it would create.149 Without
146. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28.
147. Cf. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 77 (concluding that the lack of
resources for forensic laboratories leads to backlog, weaker evidence for trial,
and lack of a knowledge base to underpin analysis and interpretation of
evidentiary results).
148. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
149. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132,
112th Cong. § 104 (2011).
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additional funding for these laboratories, how can they be
expected to improve quality and cope with an ever-increasing
caseload?150 The primary cause of both the St. Paul and the
Jamaica Plain scandals was a lack of funding. At the former, a
lack of funding led to a municipal decision not to seek
accreditation;151 in the latter, a scientist trying to cope with a
burgeoning backlog of cases fraudulently produced results.152
Ultimately, budgeting money upfront to improve facilities and
deal with caseload concerns may have prevented Minnesota
and Massachusetts from now having to spend millions of
dollars on resolving these incidents.
Notably, neither of these examples concerns the processing
of DNA evidence. DNA testing’s scientific integrity and
reliability have led it to being considered the “gold standard”
in forensics.153 Laboratories performing such testing are, by
and large, both well-funded and well-regulated, to the
detriment of other types of forensic testing.154 Federal attempts
at regulating forensic facilities performing DNA analysis have
been able to appropriate more significant amounts of grant
money to ensure compliance with standards and eliminate
backlogs for DNA analysis.155 The Act fails to do the same for
other forensic disciplines like drug analysis. These disciplines
are arguably even more in need of funding due to their
widespread use in criminal prosecutions and need for further
research, yet this piece of legislation fails to even place these
disciplines on the same funding level as DNA analysis.
The Act also fails to address other oversight methods, like
state boards charged with investigating allegations of
misconduct in labs. While accreditation standards may
150. The Bureau of Justice Statistics crime lab census showed over 1.5
million backlogged forensic service requests in 2009, an increase of over
200,000 since 2008. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 13 app. tbl.1.
151. See Baran, supra note 80 (noting the new budget for the St. Paul lab
will be $1.5 million compared to the previous $800,000 annual budget for the
lab).
152. See Reich, supra note 98, at 153–54 (reporting that a new bill before
the U.S. Congress does not include backlogs).
153. Peterson & Leggett, supra note 15, at 654; id. at 646 (“By 2000, DNA
evidence was uniformly accepted in courts all across the country.”).
154. See id. at 622 (“We pour resources into DNA typing but fail to devote
the necessary funds to the collection and analysis of other types of evidence in
crime laboratories.”).
155. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14136e (2006) (authorizing $5 million annually in
grants to laboratories).
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somewhat encompass this requirement by virtue of their
regulation of lab procedures and proficiency testing, the
purpose behind these oversight boards was to ensure a process
was in place for external, independent investigations of lab
misconduct.156 Thus, these boards remain governed by the
Coverdell program. It has been established that these
requirements are not being enforced by the DOJ,157 and serious
problems remain with the boards that do exist. Both Minnesota
and Massachusetts have oversight boards in place,158 and yet
still experienced the aforementioned problems in their forensic
laboratories. The problems in Minnesota emerged publically
not from an investigation by its oversight board, but from the
work of two public defenders representing defendants affected
by the St. Paul crime lab’s conduct.159 The Jamaica Plain
incident has been handled as an internal investigation by the
state’s Department of Public Health and the state police force,
and it is unknown whether the Massachusetts oversight board
has gotten involved.160 Judging by the statutory language that
created the board,161 the Massachusetts board would not have
been able to process and investigate a complaint about
Dookhan on its own.162 Obviously the boards are meant to be
reactive, not proactive, but they need to be better-funded and
given sufficient power to investigate misconduct in order to
deter fraudulent activity like that of Annie Dookhan and poor
lab management like that of the St. Paul forensic lab.
B. IS REAL REFORM POSSIBLE?
If the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act
cannot properly reform forensic science, is there any federal
legislation that could? This section examines a few ways to
improve upon this proposed legislation, and suggests possible
effective alternatives to federal regulation. Criminal
justice
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3797k (West 2012).
157. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF GRANTS PROGRAM, supra note 51,
at 8.
158. MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 184A (2012).
159. Xiong, supra note 84, at B3.
160. See Ellement et al., supra note 92 (noting that the Department of
Health conducted an internal investigation and the state police closed the lab
after the investigation revealed the extent of the misconduct); Lavoie, supra
note 96.
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 184A (2012).
162. See id. (“The Board shall coordinate its responsibilities with the
medico-legal investigation commission.”).
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funding is an essential component to reforming the forensic
science system, but is also a double-edged sword for federal
legislation. An influx of funding to forensic laboratories for
hiring, education, and improvement of facilities could go a long
way toward ensuring forensic science is properly conducted.163
With the current financial situation of many states, the federal
government could be a good source for these funds. On the
other hand, as the proposed funding increases, the barriers to
passing the legislation multiply. The first barrier is that
regulation of local criminal justice systems has traditionally
been a prerogative of the states, and increased funding may be
considered undue intrusion into state matters by Congress.164 A
more general worry is that legislation with a significant
funding component for forensic laboratories will not pass. For
example, Senator Leahy was unable to move his Act out of the
Senate Judiciary Committee for general consideration by the
Senate,165 and that bill contained about $150 million in
appropriations.166 Congress previously passed legislation with
larger grants for facilities performing DNA analysis, but it
remains to be seen whether these latest scandals and the
recommendations of the NAS Report can motivate a more
general and generous funding scheme for non-DNA forensic
science testing.167 Focusing funding on DNA testing means that
other forensic disciplines may get left behind—and the St. Paul
and Jamaica Plain scandals illustrate that, with the amount of
evidence processed via drug analysis, mistakes and misconduct
can be costly to our criminal justice system.
A key component of any effective federal legislation on this
issue must include mandatory accreditation and certification
standards enforced through a federal mechanism. By only
carrying the threat of monetary sanctions if laboratories are
163. See Cooley, supra note 31, at 446–47 (explaining the perennial
underfunding of forensic science and that inadequate funding was a major
factor in another crime lab debacle in Houston, Texas).
164. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233–34 (arguing that states are better
positioned to make reforms than the federal government since there can be
benefits to state experimentation).
165. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
166. This number is based on my calculations of the fiscal components of
the bill, as no congressional budget office estimate was released. Criminal
Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 112th Cong. §§ 104,
305, 402; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the
appropriations the Act would have created).
167. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
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not in compliance, current and proposed federal regulations
lack sufficient means to motivate states into compliance.168
Congress should take a cue from its previous regulation of
clinical service laboratories and apply similar measures to
forensic science providers. This is not a new idea—it was
proposed as far back as 1991169—long before the most recent
lab scandals. The 1988 Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA)170 ensured quality clinical laboratory
testing in labs receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments,
primarily by requiring laboratory accreditation through either
the government or a certified outside agency.171 The difference
between CLIA and regulations of forensic laboratories are the
available sanctions: labs found in non-compliance with CLIA
may be subject to a much wider range of sanctions by the
government, including suspension of accreditation, a civil suit,
imprisonment, or fines, for those found guilty of intentionally
violating CLIA.172
If strong sanctions such as these were coupled with the
accreditation and certification requirements already present in
the Act, it would likely increase the compliance of forensic labs.
At the time of CLIA’s passage, similar legislation for forensic
labs was unworkable due to a lack of standard operating
procedures and certification for forensic professionals.173 With
the creation of ASCLD/LAB accreditation and other types of
standards, this is no longer the case. Guidelines exist for
laboratory procedure and proper education of forensic scientists
in the Act, and sanctions would then ensure that these
guidelines are followed, minimizing both poor quality lab work
and potential misconduct by bad actors. Nonetheless, these
strict sanctions may ultimately be politically unpopular
because actors in the criminal justice system are unwilling to

168. See discussion supra Part II.A.
169. See Jonakait, supra note 11, at 178–90 (suggesting CLIA could serve
as a framework for forensic science lab regulation).
170. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C.
§ 263a (2006).
171. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 196 (quoting the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services’ summary of provisions of the amendments).
172. Id. (listing the available sanctions and noting that the “list of all
laboratories that have been sanctioned during the preceding year” is
published).
173. Jonakait, supra note 11, at 180–81.
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have labs completely shut down or have fines taken from public
coffers for violations of these regulations.174
If Congress is unable or unwilling to increase federal
funding and improve enforcement of federal regulations, the
current system of a largely state-by-state approach to
managing forensic science facilities and personnel will
continue. There are positives to this approach. States are better
positioned to know the workings of their specific criminal
justice systems, and can create regulations tailored to the
situation of forensic laboratories in their jurisdictions.175
However, such a patchwork system encourages inconsistency
among the states, and further fragments a forensic science field
that is in need of universal standards.176 The state-by-state
system currently in place created the conditions allowing these
scandals to occur, and the federal government is betterpositioned to provide the regulation and funding necessary to
correct these errors and improve forensic science throughout
the nation.
CONCLUSION
Since the publication of the NAS Report, there has been
much discussion about how to address the problems and
recommendations produced in the report. The problems with
forensic laboratory procedures in Minnesota and with
fraudulent analysts like Annie Dookhan in Massachusetts
indicate that current federal and state regulations do not do
enough to ensure that our forensic facilities are producing highquality testing results that the criminal justice system can
depend on in making decisions of guilt or innocence for
thousands of people. The Criminal Justice and Forensic Science
Reform Act is one attempt at improving federal regulation of
forensic science based on the NAS Report and the
recommendations of stakeholders in the field.
174. See id. at 182 (noting that forensic labs are more often directly funded
with public money than clinical labs).
175. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 234 (“[F]ederal reform requires uniformity
and ignores the benefits of state experimentation. It ignores geographic
differences in values and the differences in the ways that states administer
their systems of criminal justice and criminal investigation.” (footnote
omitted)).
176. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 77 (“[T]he large amount of
information provided to the committee . . . all points to a system that lacks
coordination and that is underresourced . . . .”).
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Unfortunately, the Act suffers from many of the same
issues as past attempts at improving forensic science, at least
regarding accreditation and certification standards for
laboratories. Funding remains an issue at both the federal and
state levels. In order to truly improve the conduct of forensic
practitioners and the state of forensic facilities, laboratories
need to be incentivized to implement standard procedures and
hire educated, competent employees. Additionally, the
oversight boards charged with investigating complaints of
misconduct must have the tools and funding to do their job and
police these laboratories. Without these measures, the scandals
in St. Paul and Jamaica Plain will not be the last time that
forensic mishaps make the headlines.

